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History in the Making 
Hyperdemocracy: Euroscepticism and Elections 
in the United Kingdom 
 
By Edward Reminiskey 
 
 
Abstract: In the early hours of June 24th, 2016, the results of a 
referendum asking the United Kingdom to determine its 
membership status in the European Union were made official. 
Decided by a slim majority, the decision was made by the 
electorate to leave the European Union. To characterize this 
moment as being uncertain would be an understatement. It stood 
as a major turning point in twenty-first century politics, and 
presents an opportunity to explore the recent phenomenon 
affecting liberal democracy. “Brexit,” as it would be referred to, 
instigated scholars to ask important questions about the 
contemporary state of liberal democracy. What happens when a 
liberal democracy undermines itself? How can scholars 
characterize the latest trends in liberal democracy? This paper 
attempts to answer these types of questions by viewing recent 
developments in the United Kingdom, utilizing the lens of 
hyperdemocracy theory, and applying it to elections and political 
media analysis. 
 
 
 
 
Initial scholarly work done on hyperdemocracy is significant, but 
application of such an underdeveloped theory requires additional 
discussion.  In continuing that discussion, this paper will review 
the precise definition of hyperdemocracy and demonstrate how it is 
applicable to a specific event like the Brexit referendum. The 
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reason hyperdemocracy can be used to analyze Brexit, has much to 
do with the politics leading to the 2016 vote.  While the politics are 
important, this paper additionally focuses on the behavior of the 
traditional media in the referendum campaign, supporting the main 
argument that hyperdemocracy was encouraged by the traditional 
media. Instead of turning to traditional media, the British people 
took advantage of the social media phenomenon, an imperative of 
hyperdemocracy and the information age. 
 
Hyperdemocracy 
 
The term hyperdemocracy has appeared in the lexicon of political 
science at various instances. In Hyperdemocracy, written by 
political theorist Stephen Welch, he discusses in his prelude that 
the term hyperdemocracy has only been used in specific 
frameworks, or has been tossed around without much care on the 
internet.1 Most notably, the term was used by Spanish philosopher 
José Ortega y Gasset in his book, Revolt of the Masses, to describe 
a state where the “masses” obtain political power by undermining 
the rule of law and exerting its will through “material pressure.” 
Welch and his seemingly overlooked body of work, offers an 
important discussion on the political-theoretical definition of 
hyperdemocracy that transcends many preceding explanations.2 
As the prefix would suggest, a literal definition of 
hyperdemocracy may cause one to assume that it is simply an 
excess of democratic zeal. Welch contends that while being 
important in medical terminology, hyper- cannot be applied in an 
explanation of democracy.3 Welch argues that democracy cannot 
                                                
1 Stephen Welch, Hyperdemocracy (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2013), 1. 
2 I came across this theory in my research endeavors. I was trying to articulate a 
term to describe the state of politics that preceded Brexit. With accurate 
precision, Welch theorizes the conditions that arguably made Brexit, as well as 
other seismic events like the Trump presidency, possible. His conclusions from 
the time Hyperdemocracy was published coincidentally aligned with my 
preconceived thoughts on what is being discussed here and in my other research. 
3 Welch, Hyperdemocracy, 2. 
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be precisely measured in terms of numerical value or quantity. For 
example, doctors can measure the severity of hyperthermia by 
taking a patient’s temperature. However, a doctor cannot use those 
numbers alone to diagnose; further examination of reliable 
symptomatic indicators is needed to treat the patient. 
Hyperdemocracy, as a theoretical framework, uses this kind of 
qualitative and theoretical analysis; it looks at the symptoms 
beyond the numbers. It is important to note that this is not to 
dismiss the quantitative work of political scientists. However, for 
the purposes of this paper, hyperdemocracy as a theory is being 
used to historically analyze a specific moment in British politics.  
Welch ultimately concludes that the best definition of 
hyperdemocracy can simply be described as the intensification of 
democracy.4 But what does this intensification mean? The kind of 
pluralism that should exist in a healthy democratic system bleeds 
uncontrollably into all levels of society, from the actual political 
arena into the media, workplace, schools, families, and so on. 
Welch makes the important statement that the “constitutive” 
elements that make up democracy are democratized themselves.5 
Thus, there is an undermining effect, where the intensification of 
democracy makes democracy a less viable system of governance. 
There is much to add to Welch’s theory. Borrowing from 
another hyper-ism prominent in social and cultural criticism, 
hyperdemocracy may additionally be characterized by the same 
inversion or distortion found in hypermodernity. Hypermodernity, 
as put best by French social theorist Gilles Lipovetsky, is the phase 
succeeding postmodernism, and is defined by hyperconsumption 
and hypermodern individuals wherein a society’s quick 
progression becomes the norm, and the sense of time becomes 
alien. His ideas on hypermodernity were originally applied to 
consumerist societies, but are easily relatable to Welch’s theory of 
hyperdemocracy: 
 
                                                
4 Ibid., 3. 
5 Ibid., 4. 
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The first version of modernity was extreme in 
ideological and political terms; the new modernity 
is extreme in a way that goes beyond the political – 
extreme in terms of technologies, media, 
economics, town planning, consumption, and 
individual pathology. Pretty much everywhere, 
hyperbolic and sub-political processes now 
comprise the new face of liberal democracies. Not 
everything is dancing to the tune of excess, but 
nothing is safe, one way or another, from the logic 
of the extreme.6  
 
Nevertheless, hypermodernity is not completely divorced from the 
political discussion on hyperdemocracy. The bleeding effect 
described by Welch is not without merit; it is grounded in larger 
themes about technological and societal progress. Research on this 
topic synthesizes these concepts and theories and applies them to a 
specific and unique moment in British politics, beginning an 
important discussion on the most compelling features that define 
twenty-first-century liberal democracy. 
 
A Summary of Euroscepticism in British Elections 
 
While hyperdemocracy does not necessarily translate into “more 
elections,” a thorough analysis of the EU issue cannot ignore the 
electoral history of the United Kingdom that preceded Brexit. 
While the referendum campaign officially started on April 15, 
2016, the demand for a referendum and the issue itself predates 
this by many years. The issue did not come to the forefront 
electorally until after the 2008 global financial crisis.  However, it 
would be a mistake to suggest that the issue originated in the 
global financial crisis.  Ironically, the argument to leave 
                                                
6 Gilles Lipovetsky, “Time Against Time, or The Hypermodern Society,” in 
Supplanting the Postmodern: An Anthology of Writings on the Arts and Culture 
of the Early 21st Century, eds. David Rudrum and Nicholas Stavris, 156-171 
(London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015). 
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conceivably began immediately after the referendum campaign to 
join the EU in 1973. Neither can one leave out Margaret 
Thatcher’s departure from British politics. Her decision to step 
down from her tenure as leader of the Conservatives in the early 
1990s was largely due to her opposition of any further European 
integration. Her own party was committed to supporting the newly 
ratified Treaty of Maastricht, which laid the foundation for a 
political and monetary union.7 When the United Kingdom 
attempted to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism, a currency 
valuation scheme for European currencies wishing to join the Euro, 
it quickly had to retract its ambition to join the common currency 
in the fiasco known as Black Wednesday. Nevertheless, the 
European issue would never reach the levels of intensity it has seen 
in the twenty-first century.  Therefore, the following section will 
summarize the key people and events that encouraged the British 
government to throw the European issue to the public in a 
referendum, thus initiating the conditions necessary for 
hyperdemocracy.  
The Treaty of Lisbon ratified in 2009 is perhaps the key 
turning point in the story of how the United Kingdom came to 
leave the EU. The most powerful harbingers of Euroscepticism 
came from the Conservatives, who at this time were the national 
opposition in the UK Parliament, but had gained a plurality of seats 
from the United Kingdom in the 2009 European Parliament 
elections. In response to the ongoing negotiation and ratification of 
Lisbon by the majority Labour government headed by Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown, the Conservatives significantly changed 
their tune regarding European politics. Due to their dissatisfaction 
with provisions in the Treaty of Lisbon, the Conservatives left the 
major center-right European People’s Party, and formed their own 
party known as the Alliance of European Conservatives and 
Reformists.8 This was party leader David Cameron’s appeasement 
to Eurosceptics in his own party, and was used to temporarily quell 
                                                
7 Frederick Painton, "It Is Time to Go," Time 136, no. 24 (1990): 60-65. 
8 “Conservative MEPs Form New Group,” BBC News, last modified June 22, 
2009, accessnews.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8112581.stm. 
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the rise of the UK Independence Party led by Nigel Farage, a 
populist juggernaut of anti-EU politics: 
 
We believe Britain’s interests are best served by 
membership of a European Union that is an 
association of its Member States. We will never 
allow Britain to slide into a federal Europe. 
Labour’s ratification of the Lisbon Treaty without 
the consent of the British people has been a betrayal 
of this country’s democratic traditions. In 
government, we will put in place a number of 
measures to make sure this shameful episode can 
never happen again.9 
 
The UK Independence Party (UKIP) is a “rejectionist-Eurosceptic” 
party, as opposed to, generally speaking, “reformist-Eurosceptic” 
Conservatives, who advocate for the complete withdrawal of the 
United Kingdom from the EU.10 The party began in the 1990s in 
response to the passage of the Treaty of Maastricht. The party was 
a small, irrelevant force until the 2000s, when Conservatives and 
Labour both alienated their traditional bases. Growth of a 
democratic deficit and low turnout in European elections in 
addition to dissatisfaction with national politics led to higher 
                                                
9 “Invitation to Join the Government of Britain: The Conservative Manifesto,” 
Conservative Party, April 2010, 113.  
10 Euroscepticism is a difficult term to properly define because it includes a 
broad range of perspectives on European integration. It could simply mean 
skepticism of European institutions, but can also include criticism or reformism. 
Skepticism or criticism doesn’t necessarily mean opposition to the EU either. 
Perspectives can be from the right or the left of the political spectrum. Some 
Eurosceptics might prioritize criticizing specific problems with the EU over 
others, such as strong desires for economic cooperation and trade but limits on 
migration and immigration. Some want reform, while others want disposal of 
the entire project. UKIP is an outright rejectionist political force, while the 
Conservatives are nuanced and more willing to negotiate membership terms 
with the EU. 
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returns for UKIP.11 UKIP placed second to the Conservatives in 
the 2009 European Parliament elections. The man that arguably 
defined the party and led it to national prominence, Nigel Farage, 
shifted the party strategy from policy advocacy to heavy 
competition for seats in national and local elections.12 The key 
moment in this strategy came in 2013, when UKIP had a net gain 
of 139 seats in local councils.13 Many saw this as a form of 
backlash from mainly Conservative voters, who were disillusioned 
by Prime Minister David Cameron and his coalition government 
with Nick Clegg and the Liberal Democrats. David Cameron’s 
earlier attempts to regain his base, which were those voters more 
sensitive to migration issues and the European Union, had failed 
spectacularly. 2013 was incredibly important for the push of a 
referendum, because it forced David Cameron to cater to his 
party’s Members of Parliament, whose seats were threatened by 
diminishing support and the increased vote returns for UKIP. The 
trend of voter defections would continue into 2014, when elections 
to the European Parliament would be held. 
The 2014 European Parliament elections were a significant 
turning point in British and European politics. Firstly, political 
parties viewed them as a prelude to what was going to come in the 
2015 general election, where any number of outcomes could take 
place. The coalition government between the Conservatives and 
                                                
11 Robert Ford, Matthew J. Goodwin, and David Cutts. "Strategic Eurosceptics 
and Polite Xenophobes: Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP) in the 2009 European Parliament Elections." European Journal of 
Political Research 51, no. 2 (2012): 208. 
12 Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin, Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support 
for the Radical Right in Britain (New York: Routledge, 2014), 241-242. 
13 Christopher Hope, “Local elections 2013: Nigel Farage's Ukip surges to best 
ever showing, winning 150 seats,” The Daily Telegraph, last modified May 3, 
2013, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ukip/10036463/Local-
elections-2013-Nigel-Farages-Ukip-surges-to-best-ever-showing-winning-150-
seats.html 
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Liberal Democrats was incredibly unpopular.14 The European 
Parliament elections traditionally served as opportunities for 
parties to express policy positions not just on the EU, but also on 
domestic issues. The BBC and LBC debates that took place 
between UKIP leader Nigel Farage and Deputy Prime Minister 
Nick Clegg, were quite symbolic and representative of this 
phenomenon. It must be first stated that these debates were far 
removed from “normal,” the debates were not about who should 
represent the United Kingdom in the European Parliament, rather 
they took the role of determining if the country should be in the 
EU at all.15 This was a profound moment in British politics, and 
supports the point about inversion within the theory of 
hyperdemocracy. Secondly, the 2014 elections resulted in UKIP 
winning a plurality of seats, the first party to do so since Labour in 
the early twentieth century. Research has shown that this election 
was ripe for “strategic voting.”16  
Using the two individuals who participated in the 
aforementioned debates helps shed light on why this was the case. 
Farage, a supposed political outsider due to his inability to be 
elected to Westminster, embodied the kind of monkey wrench that 
many disaffected members of the British electorate craved. They 
did not need to agree with all he said, his command of populist 
rhetoric, combined with his uncensored and charismatic 
personality, were what they craved. European elections, marred by 
consistently low turnout in the twenty-first century, bestowed an 
opportunity for the electorate to vote for a party who could shake 
the political system in Brussels, while keeping domestic politics 
relatively untouched. UKIP held no seats in Westminster until 
several defections later that year. Clegg had much more on the 
                                                
14 David Cutts and Andrew Russell, “From Coalition to Catastrophe: The 
Electoral Meltdown of the Liberal Democrats,” Parliamentary Affairs 68, no. 1 
(2015): 70–87. 
15 It should also be noted that UKIP and other rejectionist-Eurosceptics in the 
European Parliament are quite fascinating because they are elected to sit in the 
very institution they want to disrupt, leave, or dismantle entirely. 
16 Ford, Goodwin, and Cutts. “Strategic Eurosceptics,” 208. 
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line, not only defending the United Kingdom’s membership in the 
EU, but also his party’s electability in the general elections of the 
following year. The amount of political capital he had to lose far 
exceeded the amount Farage had at all. Thus, he could not make 
any serious mistakes. Unfortunately for him, by the end of the two 
debates Farage appeared to hold a better position, and one could 
easily predict the severity of the Liberal Democrats’ losses, both in 
the 2014 European Parliament election and in the 2015 general 
election.17 The performance of both candidates in these debates 
foreshadowed the electoral picture that would emerge in British 
politics over the next few years. The most significant development 
from this election is that all over Europe, many Eurosceptic 
parties’ vote shares considerably increased. 
The 2015 general election displayed a continuation of the 
trends that had been sweeping British politics. The Conservatives 
were expected to lose to Labour according to the polls, but 
sometimes the pollsters do not have a finger on the pulse of the 
election. Similar to the debates from 2014, the persona of the 
leaders meant more than their positions. Nigel Farage paid 
attention to leadership favorability ratings, and quite brilliantly hit 
all the right marks in describing the negative leadership qualities of 
David Cameron, Nick Clegg, and Ed Miliband. According to 
Farage, these men embodied the Blairite politicking of New 
Labour, focusing on and representing the young, university 
educated, middle class city dwellers. Nigel Farage capitalized on 
these characteristics and spoke to the left-behind, or old Labour, 
which represented the older, white working-class who were 
already Eurosceptic, and had strong feelings about immigration, 
free trade agreements and traditional British culture. However, due 
to the election system and constituency boundaries, UKIP did not 
manage to win any new seats despite having double digit support 
nationwide. Additionally, the Conservatives won because UKIP 
was not just eating into their vote share, but UKIP also ate slightly 
                                                
17 Typically, junior coalition partners suffer heavy losses in elections after 
entering government. From the BBC debate, Farage won according to a YouGov 
poll with 57%. See results: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-26737934 
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into the vote share of people who traditionally voted Labour. The 
Conservatives emerged from this election with a majority 
government and an opportunity to conduct the referendum on 
European Union membership that David Cameron had promised at 
his famous Bloomberg speech in 2013.18 
The Brexit referendum has been characterized as the third 
gamble Prime Minister David Cameron made in his string of 
gambles with referenda.19 He had emerged politically victorious by 
the end of his coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. 
Two referendums, the 2011 Alternative Vote Referendum and the 
2014 Scottish Independence Referendum, had both worked to his 
favor by failing to pass.20 Cameron was going to use the 
momentum he had gained from the referendums, and the 2015 
general election to make the case for supporting the United 
Kingdom remaining in the EU. Unfortunately for him, this 
momentum did not match the intensity of the EU issue that 
predated his tenure as leader of the Conservatives and his recent 
electoral victories.  
Welch focuses on the cognitive dimension of democracy to 
explain hyperdemocracy. Brexit did not happen in a vacuum. 
There were several factors driving the vote to leave.21 The zeitgeist 
of the moment pointed toward a result that directed the United 
Kingdom to leave the EU. Immigration and issues of sovereignty 
defined the campaign. For example, the concurrent European 
Migrant-Refugee Crisis only intensified the already divisive 
immigration issue. Even though the United Kingdom was not part 
                                                
18 David Cameron, “EU speech at Bloomberg,” Government of the United 
Kingdom (speech, Prime Minister’s Office, 2013). 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg. 
19 Harold D. Clarke, Matthew J. Goodwin, and Paul Whiteley. Brexit: Why 
Britain Voted to Leave the European Union, (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017), 2-3. 
20 The Alternative Vote referendum was conducted as part of the agreement 
made for the coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. It would change 
the electoral system for electing Parliament from the first-past-the-post system 
to an instant-runoff system. 
21 Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley, Brexit, 153-170. 
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of the Schengen Area, media portrayal of migrants and refugees 
had an impact on the campaign. As an institution founded on the 
freedom of movement, the EU’s perceived inability to control 
external borders was attacked by the Leave campaign. Any 
observer of the campaign cannot forget the controversial ‘Breaking 
Point’ poster launched by UKIP.22 
Adding more analysis to the cognitive element promoted by 
Welch, the Brexit referendum occurred at such a specific moment 
in British politics and history of Europe, that it is quite conceivable 
that the concentration and meshing of the conversation in elections 
between 2014 and 2016 engendered an eternal campaign. A 
campaign that never ends with complex baggage unable to be 
dropped by a single vote or referendum. There is not much tangible 
evidence to support this claim, but theoretically in a 
hyperdemocracy the political campaign never ends, nor does the 
intensity or risk. Perhaps this might be due to the media’s role as a 
permanent institution of democracy, and that only in a 
hyperdemocracy would such an eternal campaign exist. 
 
The Media: A New Constituency? 
 
Inversion and distortion are significant traits of hyperdemocracy. 
Welch refers to several areas of liberal democracy where this 
appears to be the case. The most notable feature of a healthy liberal 
democracy is an objective and honest media culture.23 There 
appears to be a crisis of objectivity in the British media. Welch 
used the controversy of the MMR vaccine in the 1990s to support 
his case.24 The intersection of science, politics, and media 
stimulated a hyperdemocratic moment. The media’s involvement 
in the controversy chipped away not only at their own objectivity, 
                                                
22 Josh Lowe, “Brexit: UKIP Launches ‘Breaking Point’ Immigration Poster,” 
Newsweek, last modified June 16, 2016. 
23 Pippa Norris, A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Postindustrial 
Societies (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 22-
35. 
24 Welch, Hyperdemocracy, 124-130. 
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but also the objectivity of medical science. The distortion from this 
controversy came from the inability to distinguish between 
honestly reported facts and mere sensationalism. Journalists do not 
all have the privilege of being qualified judges of scientific fact. 
Conversely, one scientist or even a tiny cabal of scientists, are not 
the sole arbiters of truth. The politicization of science is a key 
indicator of hyperdemocracy. The role the media played in the 
referendum campaign on EU membership mimicked the role it 
played in the interference of scientific inquiry.  
The media played a large role in the Brexit referendum. It 
is quite common, but problematic in terms of objectivity, for 
editorial boards of newspapers and publications to endorse 
politicians or political parties in elections. This trend took on a 
unique role in the 2016 referendum where endorsement was for 
bigger and riskier implications, namely the fate of the country 
itself.  Statements such as, “The Guardian will make no apology, 
between now and 23 June, for making the case for Britain in 
Europe as clearly, as honestly and as insistently as possible,”25  
and, “In supporting a vote to leave, we [The Daily Telegraph] are 
not harking back to a Britannic golden age lost in the mists of time 
but looking forward to a new beginning for our country. We are 
told it is a choice between fear and hope. If that is the case, then 
we choose hope,”26 serve as examples of the media bias taking 
place at the time. 
Media outlets for either side of the referendum campaign 
sought to persuade as many as they could. Instead of endorsing a 
party in a “normal” election, the media endorsed a specific action 
or inaction with large consequences to follow, regardless of the 
outcome. While the referendum on EU membership was 
                                                
25 “The Guardian view on the EU debate: David Cameron makes a serious case,” 
The Guardian, last modified May 9, 2016. 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/may/09/the-guardian-view-
on-the-eu-debate-david-cameron-makes-a-serious-case 
26 “Vote leave to benefit from a world of opportunity,” The Daily Telegraph, last 
modified June 20, 2016. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2016/06/20/vote-
leave-to-benefit-from-a-world-of-opportunity/ 
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unbinding, it answered an important question about the British 
electorate’s willingness to divorce from the EU. The media 
participated in the referendum campaign not as objective 
correspondents, but as disguised intermediaries of divergent 
opinions. In this respect, the media mirrored and fed into the 
divided electorate. The democratic process infiltrated the British 
media and intensified the referendum campaign.27 
 
Social Media and Hyperdemocracy 
 
It would be a disservice to the theory of hyperdemocracy to not 
include analysis of the social media phenomenon. While it might 
be useful in political science-oriented research to conduct content 
analysis or surveys on internet behaviors, this research explores the 
implications of social media. The internet is a treasure trove of 
evidence for historians and social scientists alike. However, instead 
of finding the hypothetical needle(s) in the haystack that would 
provide insight on the specific issue in this paper, it is more 
conducive to analyze the meaning of the haystack itself.   
In many respects, social media has replaced much of the 
political discussion that used to take place in “traditional forums.” 
This has occurred in such a significant manner that it has almost 
become the new norm in political communication. Social media 
allows for the average person with an internet connection, almost 
always within arms-reach with the prevalence of cellphones, to be 
instantly and simultaneously informed at the same time as the rest 
of their fellow citizens about anything of interest or concern. 
Manuel Castells theorized this new information age with networks, 
stating that “a network-based social structure is a highly dynamic, 
open system, susceptible to innovating without threatening its 
balance. Networks are appropriate instruments... for a polity geared 
                                                
27 Banks, businesses, international organizations, public figures, etc. joined in on 
the endorsement front of the campaign – further intensifying the campaign and 
heightening the risk factor. Boris Johnson dubbed the scaremongering and large 
swath of endorsements on the ‘Remain’ side as “Project Fear,” borrowing the 
term from the 2014 Scottish independence referendum campaign. 
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toward the instant processing of new values and public moods.”28 
Social media matured in the mid-2010s, and took on a life of its 
own. The Brexit referendum had a serious social media element as 
nearly anyone could disseminate their own political opinions and 
reactions to the day-to-day politics of the campaign. The concept 
of “following” someone on a social media platform was built into a 
stream of information customized to confirm each person’s own 
biases.29 An individual on these platforms is instantaneously and 
intensely informed about politics. As a consequence, social media 
allows a person to perceive themselves as empowered within the 
democratic process. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has applied a specific theory about the state of liberal 
democracy to a specific instance in British political history. While 
the theory of hyperdemocracy can be applied in practical forms, 
such as in the study of quick and successive elections or pressure 
from radical movements like UKIP on established political parties. 
In this environment of political accelerationism, it has become 
apparent that the traditional media establishment has done their 
best to polarize themselves and mirror the divided electorate they 
fail to objectively inform. The collapse in trust of traditional media 
allowed the vacuum to be filled by social media, where reliable 
reporting is hard to come by as tailored information is rapidly 
presented and recycled by users, and political identities can easily 
be advertised.  
                                                
28 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 2nd ed. (Malden, Mass.: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1996). 
29 Perhaps the darker side of social media revealed after Brexit was the unveiling 
of foreign interference on social media platforms. Bots and hackers can 
manipulate the algorithmic inner workings of a social media platform to commit 
malicious, opinion-modifying campaigns. Whether or not these “troll” 
campaigns are effective is not the issue, but the mere fact that these platforms 
are being targeted by foreign entities poses a challenge for governments and tech 
companies. 
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However, where does liberal democracy in the United 
Kingdom go from here? The British government thus far has 
proved incapable of delivering a promise that it did not support 
itself, but half its voting population did. The 2017 general election 
saw the Conservatives and the fresh leadership of Theresa May 
lose a majority government, despite explicitly promising to 
implement Brexit. The inclusion of the so-called “Irish backstop,” 
or an indefinite soft border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, 
has particularly complicated the negotiations to leave. A deal that 
can satisfy a majority in Parliament and be received well among 
the public remains to be seen. The uncompromising negotiation 
style of the European Union has shown itself to be an issue once 
again, with precedent from the painful Greek bailout setting an 
example. Surely by the time this piece is published a clearer 
picture will have emerged, but for the long-term health of British 
politics, the damage has already been done. The political 
realignment that has been occurring for the better part of a decade 
will not only have to find the right footing in a post-EU United 
Kingdom, it will also have to reconcile the two halves of society 
that voted differently in the 2016 referendum. Perhaps this will be 
a test for the Union itself, an issue with the potential to be even 
larger than Brexit. 
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